The ladder of foreign sales by Békés, Gábor & Muraközy, Balázs
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BUDAPEST, 2015 
 
MT-DP – 2015/27 
 
 
 
The ladder of foreign sales: 
Internationalization modes of European firms 
GÁBOR BÉKÉS – BALÁZS MURAKÖZY
 2 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2015/27 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
The ladder of foreign sales: Internationalization modes of European firms 
Authors: 
 
 
Gábor Békés  
senior research fellow 
Institute of Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
CEU and CEPR 
e-mail: bekes.gabor@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
Balázs Muraközy 
senior research fellow 
Institute of Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
e-mail: murakozy.balazs@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
June 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-615-5447-89-1 
ISSN 1785 377X 
 3 
 
The ladder of foreign sales:  
Internationalization modes of European firms 
 
Gábor Békés – Balázs Muraközy 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper show evidence that firms choose from a much larger set of internationalization 
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many qualitative variables, includes direct information on indirect and direct exporting, 
outsourcing, service and manufacturing FDI and operating business groups. We generalize a 
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indirect exporting does not seem to require a high fixed cost, while the fixed cost of FDI is 
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Az európai vállalatok nemzetközivé válásának 
lépcsőfokai 
 
Békés Gábor – Muraközy Balázs 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
A tanulmány arra szolgáltat bizonyítékot, hogy a vállalatok sokkal több nemzetközivé válási 
mód közül választhatnak, mint amennyit általában a külkereskedelmi szakirodalom 
feltételezett. A tanulmány azt is megmutatja, hogy ez a választás hasonló módon alakul, mint 
amit a Helpman–Melitz–Yeaple-modell (2004) feltételez. Egy olyan különleges adatbázisból 
indulunk ki, amely a mérleg és sok más mennyiségi mutató mellett közvetlen információt 
tartalmaz arról, hogy a vállalat közvetlenül vagy közvetve exportált-e, kiszervezte-e 
termelését, volt-e termelő vagy szolgáltató leányvállalata és tagja volt-e üzleti csoportnak. 
Tanulmányunkban úgy általánosítjuk az önszelekció modelljét, hogy a két dimenzió – a 
termelékenység és a minőség – szempontjából heterogén vállalatok N nemzetközivé válási 
mód közül választhatnak. A modell becslésével bemutatjuk, hogy az önszelekciós modell jól 
írja le a sok mód közötti választást, és megmutatjuk, hogy a termelékenység és a minőség 
hasonlóan fontos szerepet játszik ebben a döntésben. Az eredmények az egyes módok 
költségszerkezetéről is szolgálnak információval: úgy tűnik például, hogy az indirekt 
exportálás fix költsége nem túl magas, de a külföldi leányvállalat alapításának fix költsége 
lényegesen magasabb, mint az exporté vagy a kiszervezésé. Azt is bemutatjuk, hogy 
amennyiben olyan vállalatokra összpontosítjuk figyelmünket, amelyek függetlenek és 
nincsenek vertikális leányvállalataik – amilyen vállalatokat az önszelekciós modellek 
általában feltételeznek –, akkor az eredmények megmaradnak, bár a becsült különbségek 
kisebbek.  
 
Tárgyszavak: Heterogén vállalatok, export, FDI, nemzetközi válás módjai, multinomiális 
logit 
 
JEL kódok: F14, F23 
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1. Introduction
Firms can serve foreign markets in different manners. Sometimes manufacturers
sell their own product to clients directly or wholesalers buy from several manufacturers
and sell to several partners. Sometimes wholesale and retail activity is conducted
within vertically integrated firms and consumers can find directly imported goods on
store shelves. On other occasions firms choose foreign production to serve consumers
directly. The choice of internationalization mode is important for firms as each mode
requires a significant amount of investment and it can affect the cost of exporting for a
long period of time.
Firms’ choice between different internationalization modes enables us to test impor-
tant predictions of theories about organizational choices in international trade. Indeed,
as we will present in the next section, recent theories argue that internationalization
mode is systematically related to the characteristics of firms: more productive firms
may be more willing to invest into internationalization modes which require larger
fixed costs but can be operated at smaller variable costs. The literature1 has argued
that this sorting can affect trade patterns and reallocation following trade liberaliza-
tion. Also, understanding the mechanisms behind internationalization mode choice may
provide guidance for policies aimed at helping firms to establish long-term competitive
advantage in foreign markets.
Furthermore, detailed trade statistics do not take into account all kinds of trade
equally, hence the research on internationalization modes may help in understanding
the possible uses and limitations of different datasets. Disaggregated trade data, for
example, typically links transactions only to the firm conducting the deal, hence clas-
sifying firms exporting through intermediaries as non-exporters. Similarly, the sales of
foreign affiliates will not show up in the exports of their parent company, hence foreign
sales of FDI-conducting firms may be understated.
This paper compares manufacturing firms based on their mode of internationaliza-
tion. In order to do this, we use European survey data gathered in the European Firms
in a Global Economy (EFIGE) project. The questionnaire distinguished three modes
of internationalization2. First, firms can sell their products directly to corporate and
final consumers; this is direct trade. Second, they may sell to local intermediaries who
will then sell it to consumers abroad; this is indirect trade. Finally, they may have sales
from foreign production, or FDI.
For example, if a French company sells directly to a German buyer, it is direct trade.
If a French company sells to a France based intermediary (French or foreign owned),
and this latter sells to a German customer, it is indirect trade. Finally, sales from
foreign production (horizontal FDI) takes place when the French firm earlier set up a
1For instance see Helpman et al. (2004) or Das et al. (2007).
2Our data does not allow a distinction between own product and carry along trade as suggested by
Bernard et al. (2012).
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German affiliate and it is this affiliate that sells locally.
Most of the literature on internationalization mode choice builds on datasets which
do not permit analyzing the full set of internationalization modes available for manu-
facturing firms, i.e. the firm-level choice between indirect exports, direct exports and
FDI. On the one hand, trade data allow for calculating the total trade by intermedi-
aries, but it is not possible to link it to producers; also, production by foreign affiliates
does not show up in such datasets. For example Tang and Zhang (2011) considered
product-destination level data and explained the share of exports by the prevalence of
intermediaries in each product destination pair. On the other hand, firm-level data
usually do not include indirect exports. Such databases allow researchers to compare
manufacturing firms with wholesalers rather than directly and indirectly exporting man-
ufacturers. A good example for such an approach is Bernard, Grazzi and Tomasi (2011)
who classified firms by their sector classification and compared their features.
Our first contribution is to analyze trade mode choice with the cross-country EFIGE
database which explicitly asks about the export mode of each firm together with a
number of important quantitative and qualitative questions. This allows us to describe
similarities and differences among manufacturing firms by three types of international-
ization mode3.
Our second contribution is that we interpret our findings in a simple model with
three internationalization choices: indirect exporting, direct exporting and conducting
FDI. We show that the small number of indirect exporters and their similarity to non-
exporters suggests that the cost structure of this internationalization mode consists
of relatively high fixed costs and/or high marginal costs. As a consequence, sorting
models are less good in describing the choice between indirect trade through domestic
intermediaries and direct exporting than among non-exporting, exporting and FDI.
Finally, we also show that - besides size and productivity - variables that may affect
the relative fixed or marginal costs of internationalization modes - belonging to a group,
importing or market access - have the predicted effect on this choice.
In what follows, we first review the literature on mode selection and impact of
contracting issues on cost structure of various modes. Next, we describe the dataset
and offer some descriptive statistics. Internationalization mode selection is analyzed in
three steps: we first present a simple theoretical framework, followed by a comparison
of firms choosing different internationalization modes, and describe what data imply
about their relative cost structure. Finally, we analyze how variables related to theories
of contractual frictions affect the cost structure of different internationalization modes,
and hence, affect the probability of a firm’s choice. The final section concludes.
3In terms of considering direct versus indirect traders, our dataset is closest to that of the EBRD
on Turkey used in Abel-Koch (2011).
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2. Modes of serving foreign markets
In this review, we look at the characteristics of different internationalization modes,
on how firm heterogeneity affects internationalization mode choice as well as consider
what may affect the cost structure of various options. We will concentrate on the
choice between direct and indirect exports, which got significantly less attention than
the choice between exporting and FDI, which was surveyed by several authors.
2.1. Internationalization modes
Direct trade can be defined quite straightforwardly: this is international commerce
carried out by the manufacturer itself. One important distinction can be made when
trade is carried out from a foreign country. This may be because the firm sets up
a trading (wholesaler) arm abroad or offshore production outside the home country
(FDI).
Indirect trade includes several forms. For example in the US, 4, an “export mer-
chant” buys and sells on his own account, purchasing goods from the manufacturer
only to repackages and sell under its own brand. This agent will cover marketing and
promotion costs but not potential losses related to unsold goods. An import agent (ex-
port commission house in the US) does the same for importers5. In homogeneous goods
such as cotton or wheat, specialized brokers will act as facilitators for a fee. The most
complex services are offered by export management companies who do foreign mar-
ket research, marketing, distribution, logistics, shipping and export intelligence and
language translation services. A similar but broader category is an export trading com-
pany which, sometimes set up by the manufacturer overseas, provides export related
services but also deals with products (buys and sells). Of course, some types of business
would be not registered in our data - for example when a freight forwarder facilitates
the shipments of goods acting as port representative, it would be still registered as a
deal by the (direct) exporter.
This paper aims at linking two strands of the literature. First, the literature on
trade intermediaries attempted to identify the functions such intermediaries play in
facilitating international trade. Second, discussions of horizontal FDI describes circum-
stances when firms will decide to invest abroad by setting up sales or production and
sales facilities.
As suggested by Spulber (1996), the primary role of intermediaries is to offer spe-
cialized trade transaction services. Intermediaries also help the matching process. As in
4According to the South United States Trade Association, see http://www.susta.org/export/
intermediaries.html
5An additional method described by US trade association is ”piggyback marketing” when one man-
ufacturer distributes another firm’s product(s) thus these firms avoid marketing and distribution costs.
Such product lines are frequently complementary and sold to the same customer base. Sometimes,
even large companies do it in selected markets, e.g. Sony distributes in Japan for Whirlpool (source:
SUSTA). In Bernard et al. (2012), this is called the carry along trade (CAT).
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the general equilibrium modeling of the middlemen in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987),
trade intermediaries reduce search costs, which may be related, inter alia, to costs of
setting up a network (Petropoulou (2011)). As the characteristics of the matching prob-
lem may be related to the contracting environment, product- or market level factors
effecting contractual problems may also affect the export mode choice.
While intermediaries seem important in practice, there is rather limited empirical
evidence on the share of intermediaries, mostly according to the limitations of available
datasets. Still, some clear patterns emerge from this literature. The main stylized fact
is that while the majority of exports is conducted directly, indirect trade also plays
a significant role in international trade6. Few authors report results about the share
of manufacturing firms exporting indirectly rather than the share of wholesalers in
exports. Lu et al. (2011), who have presented that 27% of exporters export through
intermediaries and 11% of exporters export both directly and through intermediaries
in the World Bank’s Private Enterprise Survey of Productivity and the Investment
Climate (PESPIC) data on 12,679 firms in 29 developing economies during the period
of 2002-2004. Abel-Koch (2011) used data on firms in Turkey to find that 9% of firms
exported only indirectly, 15% both directly and indirectly while 39% exported only
directly.
In addition to indirect and direct trade, the third internationalization mode for firms
in our case is to set up a production facility abroad and serve local consumers from
that plant rather than by export. In this case, the firm becomes a multinational and
internalizes the foreign sales procedure (Helpman (1984)) allowing a greater control
on the sales process. Direct sales may allow for the lowest marginal cost provided
that production costs differences would not exceed savings from transport costs. The
role of foreign production was surveyed by several authors (e.g. Markusen (2004),
Barba Navaretti and Venables (2006), Helpman (2006), Helpman (2011)). In terms of
numbers, FDI-conducting firms represent between around 5 and 10 percent of firms
in surveys similar to EFIGE, depending on the size of the threshold: in Italy, for
example, 4.6 percent of firms employing at least 500 people conducted FDI (Benfratello
and Razzolini (2008)) while 10.6 percent of German firms in the Mannheim Innovation
Panel (Arnold and Hussinger (2010)) was engaged in foreign production.
6Ahn and Wei (2011) finds that 20% of China’s export is carried out by intermediaries Blum et al.
(2010) report that around 35% of imports into Chile are done through intermediaries. In Hungary
about a 30% of imports is carried out firms in wholesale and retail sector (Be´ke´s et al. (2009)). Bernard
et al. (2010) find that wholesaler and retailer firms comprise 35% of exporters, they account for only
8% of export value. In contrast, firms with operations that include both trade and production (just 5%
of firms), account for more than half the trade value. These large firms vertically integrate production
and wholesale activity and cover a great deal of international trade.
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2.2. Firm heterogeneity and selection into modes
Heterogeneous firm international trade models imply that firms self-select into in-
ternationalization modes. Building on the seminal model of Melitz (2003) in which
heterogeneous firms choose between exporting and non-exporting, a number of authors
have shown that firms follow similar sorting patterns in different dimensions of interna-
tional activity. In particular, Helpman et al. (2004) (HMY) proposed that such sorting
is present with respect to exporting and horizontal FDI. As the fixed cost component
of FDI is larger, while its marginal cost is smaller than that of exporting, investing into
FDI is only profitable for more productive firms capable of selling a larger volume on
the foreign market. This sorting pattern has been widely tested and found important;
empirical evidence is surveyed by Greenaway and Kneller (2007).
A number of recent papers proposed that a similar trade-off is present when deciding
between direct and indirect exporting, because direct exporting requires investment into
marketing and different capabilities while it may spare the firm the extra variable cost
charged by the intermediary. The main prediction of Felbermayr and Jung (2011) and
Ahn and Wei (2011) models is that firms sort themselves by their productivity level:
the least productive firms do not export, firms with medium productivity levels rely
on intermediaries, while the most productive firms export directly. In multi-country
settings firms decide on export mode for each country. As productivity increases, firms
export through intermediaries first, then proceed to directly exporting to large mar-
kets as well as exporting through intermediaries to smaller ones, and finally to direct
exporting to each of their markets.
The prediction that firms sort themselves was tested by multiple authors. Lu et al.
(2011) test sorting on the World Bank dataset of 29 developing countries and finds
that direct exporters have the highest productivity, followed by mixed (direct export
and intermediary use) traders, indirect exporters and, finally, no traders. In relation
to sorting by productivity, size is often used as a proxy of productivity. Abel-Koch
(2011) argues that there is a negative relationship between firm size and the share of
indirect export sales in total export sales and uses survey data on Turkey to support the
claim. Another potential proxy is the age of the firm that may capture the cumulated
experience of firms helping reduce fixed of directly exporting (Keller et al. (2011)).
Sorting may also be based on quality. Crozet et al. (2011) shows in a similar setting
that when firms differ in terms of quality rather than productivity, wholesalers trade
the least expensive, lower quality goods rather than the more expensive varieties which
would be implied by productivity sorting. When heterogeneity is two-dimensional -
firms differ both in terms of productivity and quality -, intermediaries will export
more expensive varieties (working for higher-cost manufacturers) as well as the least
expensive varieties (working for lower-quality manufacturers). The main prediction is
that wholesalers may help less productive firms to enter export markets so their presence
can increase the exported varieties at the aggregate level.
It is easily possible that the simple distinction between direct and indirect trade
cannot do justice to the variety of options exports face when choosing their export mode.
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One relevant dimension of this choice is whether firms export through intermediaries
based in their home country or look for a wholesaler in the foreign country. While Tang
and Zhang (2011) considers agents located at the home country (discussing indirect
versus direct exporting), Felbermayr and Jung (2011) compares intermediaries located
abroad (making it closer to the FDI direct export choice). In this paper, we consider
all these options in a comparable manner.
2.3. Determinants of cost structure: contracting
There are several reasons why firms may choose on or the other mode, including
relative transport or marketing costs. Importantly, the choice of trade modes is greatly
affected by contracting costs and risks. For example, dealing with many products, or
with unknown partners may require a great deal of contracting costs and hold-up or
intellectual property protection may pose risks and hence require a costly defensive
mechanism. Let us review some key factors.
The difference in the cost structure between direct and indirect trade in specific
markets may be affected by the fact that intermediaries can benefit from economies of
scope when they export multiple products. Akerman (2010), building on a HMY model,
assumes that intermediaries have the technology to export more than one product and
face an additional fixed cost per period which is convexly increasing as the number
of products rises. The model predicts that, owing to their specific cost structure,
intermediaries will export a greater set of products and will export to countries with a
larger fixed cost7. Akerman (2010) uses firm-level data from Sweden classifying firms
as wholesalers or manufacturers and compares the activity of these two groups. He
tests relative export sales per good and differences regarding the direction of exports
by country characteristics. This is confirmed by Bernard et al. (2012) finding that
intermediary exporters are smaller but export relatively more products and reach fewer
countries than direct exporters. This is also in line with the findings by Blum et al.
(2010) who argue that the key contribution of intermediaries is regarding expanding
product scope rather than selling to more countries.
First time sales may require finding partners and writing new contracts - no won-
der that country characteristics affect relative entry costs. Keller et al. (2011) provide
empirical evidence which supports the idea that the reduction of entry cost when ex-
porting through intermediaries is more valuable in markets where entry cost are higher.
Bernard et al. (2012) find that the share of indirect exports is positively correlated with
country-specific fixed costs, proxied by the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators8.
Organization and contracting is emphasized by Felbermayr and Jung (2011), who
analyze the choice between selling to an intermediary and setting up a wholesale oper-
7This argument may be extended into a dynamic setting where firms potentially make multiple
products (see Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011)). In this environment, intermediary exporters, who
have lower entry costs, will be more likely to add to and drop from the product mix.
8Number of documents for importing, cost of importing and time to import.
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ation abroad9. The argument emphasizes the organizational, rather than the techno-
logical side of internationalization mode choice. In this setup, contracting environment
is key: export through intermediaries becomes less likely when the enforcement of con-
tracts is weaker and, hence, hold-up problems play a more important role.
When firms invest in R&D, foster product innovation and posses more knowledge,
it becomes more important to safeguard the knowledge and hence, exclude the mid-
dlemen (Anderson and Gatignon (1986)). In the framework of Felbermayr and Jung
(2011), more knowledge-intensive export may generate more serious hold-up problems
and hence innovativeness may be correlated with a smaller share of intermediary trade.
Abel-Koch (2011), for example finds that highly skilled workforce and innovative prod-
ucts both lead to relatively less indirect exports.
Information about trading partners matter for exporting and costly information
may be an obstacle for international trade (evidence in Das et al. (2007)) especially
for smaller firms. This is why another strand of the literature views the problem of
identifying and selling to customers as a random matching process (e.g. Antra`s and
Costinot (2011)). Uncertainty related to the value of each match may lead to starting
in small (Rauch and Watson (2004)) or using intermediaries. Petropoulou (2011) uses a
pair-wise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry, where intermediaries
develop contacts and hence, expand the set of matching technologies available to traders.
In such a framework, the proportion of indirect trade to total trade is increasing in the
level of information frictions.
In a broader term, matching services include quality control under information fric-
tions (Biglaiser (1993), Biglaiser and Friedman (1994), Li (1998)) as intermediaries can
pre-screen goods. Provision of transactional services and screening are similar inas-
much they require a sunk cost investment that acts as barrier to smaller transactions.
In Dasgupta and Mondria (2011), for example, internationalization mode serves as a
signaling device. In such a case, firms are more likely to invest in signaling and export
directly if their quality is high and hence, intermediated good quality may be lower
than that of direct exports. Similarly, in the model of Tang and Zhang (2011) both
manufacturing firms and intermediaries may invest into quality verification, but the
efforts of intermediaries are non-verifiable, which generates hold-up problems. In this
model larger horizontal differentiation leads to a larger share of indirect exporters, while
greater vertical differentiation increases the share of direct exporters. On the empirical
side, Abel-Koch (2011) showed that firms with quality certification and with a recent
upgrade rely less on intermediaries.
Finally, market access may affect both fixed and marginal cost of trade operation.
More centrally located firms will be able to sell more abroad (lower marginal cost) and
hence, are more likely to invest in direct internationalization mode. Furthermore, more
centrally located firms may find information about clients more easily thus reducing
9The main difference to other models is that here direct export is not an option: firms must use a
wholesaler abroad, and the question is whether to integrate or outsource it.
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fixed costs10.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
The dataset used in this work, created by the EFIGE project, is the first harmo-
nized cross-country dataset containing quantitative as well as qualitative information
on around 150 items for a representative sample of some 15,000 manufacturing firms.
The survey covers seven European countries, Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Data from EFIGE survey was merged with balance sheet information from Amadeus
for three countries: France, Italy and Spain11. This linked dataset is exceptionally
suitable for studying the hypotheses about the internationalization mode choice of Eu-
ropean firms, and hence we focus our investigation on these countries - with providing
robustness tests for an extended sample when possible.
To set up our variable of interest, we used two questions from the EFIGE survey.
Indirect and direct exporters were identified from the question asking whether firms
exported (i) ”directly from home country”, (ii) ”through an intermediary based in
home country”. Note that about half of firms that do indirect trade would do it along
with direct trade. These firms are included in the direct trade category. Unfortunately
we cannot know what destinations are served and what products are exported directly
and indirectly.
A firm was considered having sales from a foreign production site (FDI maker) in
three cases: if it answered positively to “Does the firm currently run at least part of
its production activity in another country?” - (a) “Yes, direct investments” or (b)
“Yes, contracts and arm’s length agreements with local firms” or (c) if it answered
positively to “Has the firm sold abroad some or all of its own products/services in
2008? - Yes directly from third countries where the firm produces” and is foreign
owned12. For a robustness check, we report the most important results with a more
conservative definition (only firms answering positively to (a)) of foreign production in
10Bernard et al. (2010) showed that higher foreign market entry costs are associated with higher
share of intermediated export. Crozet et al. (2011) confirms on French custom data that the share
of exports channeled by wholesalers is larger in markets where trade costs are higher. Ahn and Wei
(2011) found that the distance of destination country is positively correlated with intermediaries export
share on Chinese data. Tang and Zhang (2011) also find a larger share of intermediated export to
more distant market. Regarding wholesalers, Akerman (2010) found significant negative coefficient for
distance in a gravity model on Swedish data.
11Unfortunately, while we could match around 90% of firms from these three countries, adding
balance sheet data is problematic for the other four countries, hence the restriction. For more on
EFIGE data, see Barba Navaretti et al. (2011).
12As we know these are production sites but we do not know if they do actually sell to local consumers,
this is just an assumption if a realistic one.
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the Appendix. Non-traders are firms who answered no to all these questions. Table 1
shows the prevalence of these internationalization modes.
Table 1: Number of observations
Country No export Indirect
export
Direct
export
Foreign
production:
contracts
FDI Total
AUT 157 8 200 40 39 444
FRA 1 324 97 1 093 318 141 2 973
GER 1 404 79 1 054 174 224 2 935
HUN 185 31 241 21 10 488
ITA 921 73 1 749 175 102 3 020
SPA 1 242 124 1 278 92 96 2 832
UK 764 26 951 191 135 2 067
Total 5 997 438 6 566 1 011 747 14 759
Note: The table contains the number of observations for the core as well as the extended sample. The
core sample includes France, Spain and Italy with data merged with Amadeus. The extended sample also
includes Germany, UK, Hungary and Austria.
The main message Table 1 is that the overwhelming majority, more than 81%, of
firms serving the foreign market exports directly. 13.3% of internationalized firms serve
the foreign market by FDI while only 5.5% of such firms chose only indirect exporting.
When considering all indirect exporters - whether they also export directly or not -,
this figure rises to 13.2%.
The share of indirect exporters is relatively low compared to the results of Lu et al.
(2011) who found that 27% of exporters exported only indirectly. This may be explained
by different definitions of indirect exporting, as only firms exporting through home-
country based intermediaries are classified as indirect exporters in the EFIGE database.
While information about foreign intermediaries would also be interesting, sorting models
can still be easily applied to this categorization. Note, however, that the fixed cost of
exporting through domestic intermediaries may be smaller than that of other types of
indirect trade, hence productivity premiums of all indirect exporters may be larger than
what is observed in our dataset.
In contrast, the share of firms engaged in foreign production is 8%, which is in line
with previous studies conducted on similar firm-level datasets.
Direct exporting is dominant in all industries. However, as shown in Table 2, in-
dustry classification affects internationalization mode choice. Internationalized firms
are nearly as likely to choose indirect exporting in food and metal than in other indus-
tries. Foreign production is also significantly less frequent in food and metals, while it
is the most frequent in the electronics and auto industries. As foods and metals tend
to be more homogeneous and represent less innovative content than other industries,
while electronics and auto manufacturing is knowledge intensive, these observations are
broadly in line with theories emphasizing hold-up problems.
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Table 2: Exporters by industry
no export indirect
export
direct
export
foreign
production:
contracts
FDI Total
Food 53.39 3.19 38.56 2.59 2.26 100
Light industries 43.79 2.41 42.35 7.06 4.38 100
Other heavy 34.25 2.5 50.44 6.63 6.19 100
Metal 49.3 4.02 38.88 4.95 2.86 100
Machinery 26.67 3.23 54.37 8.97 6.75 100
Electronics 29.11 3.02 47.54 11.11 9.21 100
Auto 36.65 1.46 45.63 8.74 7.52 100
Total 40.54 2.98 44.71 6.76 5.01 100
4. Costs and selection
4.1. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
The aim of this section is to describe the theoretical framework of our empirical
analysis. First, we sketch a model in which firms self-select and sort according to their
productivity given the cost parameters of different internationalization modes. Second,
based on the literature, we describe the variables which may affect fixed and marginal
cost of serving foreign markets in different fashions.
The theoretical framework is based on the heterogeneous firm models of Helpman
et al. (2004) and Ahn and Wei (2011)13 and includes all three internationalization modes
in the EFIGE survey. One aim of our discussion is to provide formulae for the share
and relative productivity of firms choosing different internationalization modes to link
the unobserved cost structure to empirically observable quantities.
For simplicity, in the model we consider only two countries, the home and the
foreign country. Consumers in both countries have CES preferences, with σ = 1
1−ρ > 1
denoting the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. Each consumer supplies
inelastically a unit of labor and the home country wage is set to 1.
The model assumes a continuum of heterogeneous firms which compete on a market
characterized by monopolistic competition . The productivity of firm i is denoted by ϕi.
Productivity follows a Pareto-distribution with a parameter k. For production at the
home market each firm has to pay a per-period fixed cost fd and producing q requires
l = fd + q/ϕi units of labor. Conditional on the productivity draw, firms may exit the
market and they face an exogenous probability of firm death in each period.
Firms which choose to operate on the domestic market can decide whether to sell
abroad and their internationalization mode. In the model, firms can choose between
three options regarding supplying customers in the host country. First, they can export
directly. In order to do this, they have to pay a per-period fixed cost, fdir. Second,
13For details see their online ”Technical Appendix for The Role of Intermediaries in Facilitating
Trade”
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exporting through intermediaries requires a smaller fixed cost (find < fdir), but inter-
mediaries have to prepare each unit of the product for the export market, which process
multiplies the marginal cost by γ > 1. Iceberg transportation costs (τ > 1) have to be
paid when firms export with either export mode. Third, firms may organize production
at a third country by conducting horizontal FDI. In this case, the firm has to pay a
fixed cost of fFDI > fdir, but transport costs are zero. For simplicity, we also assume
that wages are the same in both countries14. The following Table 3 summarizes costs
for various modes.
Table 3: Cost structure
Fixed cost variable cost
Domestic 0 -
Indirect find τγ
Direct fdir τ
Contract fCont η
FDI fFDI 0
Note: fFDI > fCont > fdir > find > 0 and τγ > τ >
η > 0
In such a framework, firms will sort according to their productivity level (ϕi): the
least productive firms exit or sell their products in the domestic market, firms with in-
termediate productivity levels export through intermediaries, the next more productive
firms export directly while the most productive firms conduct FDI.
In this setting the profit from indirect trade for a firm with productivity ϕ is given
by:
piind = σ
−1R(
ρϕ
τγ
P )σ−1 − find (1)
where R and P are host-country total expenditure and price level, respectively. The
profit from direct export is given by:
pidir = σ
−1R(
ρϕ
τ
P )σ−1 − fdir (2)
while the profit from FDI is:
piFDI = σ
−1R(ρϕP )σ−1 − fFDI (3)
These profit equations determine internationalization modes. First, a firm is in-
different between exporting and non exporting when pii(ϕind) = 0. This threshold
productivity level is given by:
14Alternatively, we can consider τ to be shipment cost/wage differential, assuming it remains above
unity.
11
ϕind = f
1
σ−1
ind
(σ/R)
1
σ−1
ρP
τγ (4)
Second, a firm is indifferent between exporting indirectly and directly when piind =
pidir, hence
ϕdir = (fdir − find)
1
σ−1
(σ/R)
1
σ−1
ρP
τ(1− γ1−σ) 11−σ (5)
Finally, the threshold productivity level for conducting FDI is where a firm is indif-
ferent between direct export and FDI:
ϕFDI = (fFDI − fdir)
1
σ−1
(σ/R)
1
σ−1
ρP
(1− τ 1−σ) 11−σ (6)
As the share of firms choosing different internationalization modes is observable, we
express this using the thresholds and the properties of the Pareto distribution. First, the
share of indirect exporters from all firms serving the foreign market is the probability
that a firm’s productivity is below ϕdir conditional on being an exporter (ϕ > ϕind):
Pind = 1−
(
ϕdir
ϕind
)−k
. Substituting in the thresholds:
Pind = 1−
[(
fdir − find
find
) 1
σ−1 (1− γ1−σ) 11−σ
γ
]−k
(7)
This formula reflects a number of quite intuitive patterns. First, the larger the fixed
costs of indirect exporting are, the smaller the share of indirect exporters. Second, a
larger γ reflects that the marginal cost of indirect exporting is higher, and, hence, it leads
to a smaller share of indirect exporters. Finally, the larger Pareto shape parameter, k,
reflects a smaller degree of productivity dispersion, which means that more firms are
below the direct exporting threshold. Ceteris paribus less productivity dispersion is
associated with more indirectly exporting firms. Note that τ does not play a role as
both internationalization modes include this part of the transportation cost.
As Pind is observable in our data, it can be treated as known, hence it is useful to
express the relative fixed cost: fdir/find = 1 + (1− Pind) 1−σk (1− γσ−1)γσ−1. Using this
equation, and making assumptions about k, γ and σ, one can derive the cost parameters
which can be reconciled with the observed share of indirect exporters.
Similarly, the share of firms conducting FDI from all firms serving the foreign market
is PFDI =
(
ϕFDI
ϕind
)−k
, from which it is possible to express the relative fixed cost of FDI
and indirect exports:
fFDI
find
− fdir
find
= PFDI
1−σ
k
(
1− τ 1−σ) τγ (8)
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The framework presented in this subsection embeds the three internationalization
modes observed in our data into a heterogeneous firms international trade model. In
the model, firms sort according to their productivity or size into non-exporting and the
three internationalization modes.
Motivated by the small number of indirect exporters, we have also derived formulae
which relate the share of firms choosing the different internationalization modes to the
cost structure of each internationalization mode relative to each other. These equations
allow us to provide ballpark estimates for the relative costs of each trade mode.
4.2. Sorting
In this section we compare the productivity distribution of firms by internation-
alization mode to investigate whether the predicted sorting pattern is present in the
data. Similarly to the previous section we classify firms to four categories based on
their internationalization status: non-traders, indirect exporters, direct exporters, FDI
makers15.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) can be estimated from balance sheet data. To
treat endogeneity of inputs, we estimate TFP with the method proposed by Wooldridge
(2009)16. For unobserved productivity shocks we use materials and capital in a control
function and estimate the equation for all country-industry pairs separately. We expand
the estimation by adding a control in the production function for international presence
as a proxy for potentially different set of prices that may affect productivity (Amiti and
Konings (2007)). For further details on the modified TFP, see the Appendix 2.
Simple descriptive statistics on internationalization modes, shown in Table 4, show
that there are considerable differences in such dimensions as size and age. This suggests
that export mode choice is systematically related to firm characteristics hence it can be
approached by heterogeneous firms’ internationalization models. Note that apart from
TFP, we consider employment as another simple proxy for the capacity of covering large
fixed costs.
Table 4: Observations by internationalization mode (relative frequency)
no export indirect direct indirect+direct
no foreign production 40.68 2.97 41.07 3.39
contract 1.57 0.32 3.94 1.02
FDI 0.60 0.05 1.88 0.10
contract+FDI 0.47 0.05 1.45 0.46
As Table 4 shows, there is indeed sorting based on employment and TFP for both
direct exports and foreign production. This finding is not only true for the means of
15We checked the categorization with the more conservative definition of foreign production. Results
are in the Appendix 1.
16We refer to this as original TFP in the tables.
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the variables but sorting is also reflected in stochastic dominance. This is also depicted
by the empirical cumulative density functions depicted on Figure 1. At the same time
both means and distributions suggest that indirect trading firms are hardly different
from non-traders.
Sorting is more pronounced by employment size than by TFP, especially regarding
the choice between indirect trade and direct trade. This may be explained by the fact
that firm size is a more direct measure of the economies of scale regarding fixed costs
of entry to foreign markets, but measurement issues in TFP estimation may also play
a role. In both cases, foreign producing firms are the largest and most productive and
no exporters are hardly different from indirect traders. In Table 5 the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests confirm that direct exporters and FDI conducting firms significantly
differ from non-exporting firms and each other, but indirect exporters do not differ
from non-exporters.
Figure 1: Log employment distribution
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Table 5: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for TFP, log(employment)
no exp vs. Indirect Indirect vs. Direct Direct exp vs. for prod. for prod vs fdi
D P-value D P-value D P-value D P-value
employment 0.049 0.261 0.135 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.301 0.000
TFP17 0.049 0.841 0.087 0.174 0.105 0.002 0.164 0.001
While these statistics are informative, we need to control for potential differences
across countries and industries and test sorting with such controls. To do this, we
assume that firms maximize profits and make decision on which internationalization
mode to choose subject to uncertainty and make decisions based on observable and
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unobservable variables but making mistakes at the same time. Hence we can relate to
the random utility maximization framework of McFadden (1974), where the scarcity of
information and errors made by companies makes the maximization procedure per se
less than perfect.
To test our hypotheses we run multinomial logit regressions, estimating the proba-
bility a firm i operating in country k, industry j is opting for internationalization mode
Z18. We run two regressions, with TFP and log employment - both measured at year
t− 1 - and we controls for industry and country with a set of dummies:
Pr(XMijk = Z) = F (α + β
′Gi(jk) + λk + νj + i(jk)) (9)
where Gi(jk) refers to firm level characteristics (productivity), and λk are country
dummies, νj are industry dummies. Our left hand side variable XMi(jk) is a categorical
variable related to foreign sales mode choice, Z. It can take for values: no trade, indirect
export, direct export or foreign production sales. The base category is no exporting.
Results are presented by three columns, with each showing the coefficients belonging to
a certain outcome thus allowing estimates to be compared directly via F-tests presented
at the bottom of the table. This has the advantage of not imposing an order but letting
the data speak first.
Results from the multinomial logit regressions are presented in Table 18. To handle
composition affects, we control for country and industry fixed effects in these regressions.
The first three columns show sorting by size, followed by TFP, while the last three
columns show results with both TFP and size. This suggests that employment size
and TFP matter for both the choice between indirect and direct trade as well as direct
versus foreign production sales, but indirect trade is not different from non-traders. All
results suggest that the difference between sales via foreign production vs direct export
is larger than exports vs indirect trade.
Regarding the control dummies, the estimates of industry dummies are in line with
the pattern suggested by the descriptive statistics: direct exporting and FDI are more
frequent in less homogeneous and more knowledge-intensive industries. As for country
dummies, Italian firms enjoy a slightly greater likelihood of direct (vs indirect) export,
while French firms are substantially more likely to conduct FDI.
4.3. What do these findings suggest about the cost structure?
These results show that few firms export indirectly and that the productivity pre-
mium of such exporters is small or nonexistent. In contrast, there is a relatively large
number of both direct exporters and firms conducting sales from foreign production,
and these two internationalization modes also reflect clear sorting patterns relative to
each other as well as indirect exporting firms. Intuitively, the strong evidence for sorting
18All results have been confirmed with a set of probit regressions as well as ordered probit, results
available on request.
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suggests large differences in the fixed and marginal costs of direct trade and FDI, while
the cost structure of indirect trade makes it less attractive for most firms, i.e. its fixed
and/or marginal cost should be high. In this subsection, we build on the previously
sketched simple theoretical framework to provide some ballpark estimates for the cost
structures consistent with these observations.
To do this, we need to pin down some parameters of the model. The previous
literature has provided a number of estimates for the elasticity of substitution and the
Pareto-parameter of the productivity distribution. A usual assumption about σ is that
it is between 3 and 6. In our calibration we will use σ = 4. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007)
provides a number of estimates for k, which are typically between 1.5 and 3.
Based on Equation 8, Table 7 shows the combinations of γ, fdir
find
and fFDI
find
which are
in line with the observed frequencies, Pind = 0.055 and PFDI = 0.13. As a robustness
check, we also include results with Pind = 0.27 as found by Lu et al. (2011). The
third row, for example, shows that the relative fixed costs which are consistent with the
observed export mode distribution and γ = 1.2. In this case, the fixed cost of direct
exporting when Pind = 0.055 is about 80 percent larger than the fixed cost of indirect
exporting, while the fixed cost of FDI is 28.6 times larger than the fixed cost of indirect
exporting.
The big picture is that there is a very large difference between the fixed costs of direct
exporting and FDI: the observed patterns are in line with at least a tenfold difference
between the two fixed cost levels. Sorting is less important in case of indirect vs. direct
exporting: either high γ or relatively high fixed cost of indirect exporting discourages
most firms from choosing this internationalization mode. A smaller fixed cost difference
would only be in line with much more indirect exporters, as with Pareto-distribution
firms are concentrated at lower productivity levels.
Table 6: The effect of employment on the choice between different modes of trade
Log (employment) Chi2 (p-value)
0 vs 1 0.155** 6.262
(0.062) 0.0123
1 vs 2 0.488*** 29.55
(0.023) 0
2 vs 3 0.725*** 54.32
(0.036) 0
3 vs 4 1.278*** 180.2
(0.037) 0
Observations 14,443
Log Likelihood -15106
Pseudo R2 0.100
Notes: Multinomial logit. Standard errors in parentheses, ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Regression includes sector
and country dummies.
Furthermore, the framework also implies that there should be some productivity
premium between indirect exporters and non-exporters. This is shown by a back-of-the-
envelope calculation based simply on the Pareto cumulative distribution function, which
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is presented in Table 7 with the observed share of different firms. According to this
calculation, if one dimensional sorting describes well the choice of indirect exporting,
indirect exporters should have about 10 percent productivity premium relative to non-
traders. The calculation also shows, however, that the expected premium of indirect
traders is small compared to direct exporters, which would 50 percent more productive
than non-exporters according. Nonetheless, the sorting model suggests a relatively
small but significant productivity and size premium for indirect exporters, which is in
contrast with our data.
Table 7: Average productivity by internationalization mode
Average productivity
Share k=2 k=3 k=4
Domestic 0.395 1.12 1.08 1.06
Indirect 0.033 1.30 1.19 1.14
Direct 0.491 1.92 1.53 1.37
FDI 0.081 7.03 3.47 2.50
Note: Relative to the lowest productivity active firm.
The lack of such premium and the implied high costs of indirect trade together
suggest that the idea of sorting based on productivity does not describe well the choice
of firms between non-exporting, indirect exports and direct exporting. There can be at
least two reasons for this finding. First, our data includes only indirect exports through
domestic intermediaries, and such exporting may be different from other types of indi-
rect exports: probably it does require a very small fixed cost, hence firms choosing such
exporting will be very similar to firms which do not export at all. Second, it hetero-
geneity in other dimensions besides productivity, for example in the size of sunk costs,
may play an important role in this decision, hence sorting based only on productivity
may not describe this choice well.
5. What affects internationalization mode choice?
5.1. Model extension
The previous section argued that it is possible that sorting may be affected by more
than productivity. In particular, cost items may not be fixed for all firms. In this
simple model, we consider fixed costs find, fdir and ffdi in broad sense. They shall
include expenses of setting up trade contacts, search costs finding partners, or writing
contracts. Similarly, τ and γ shall be taken in a more general sense than simply costs of
physical transportation. In particular, we include any variable costs such as filling in per
shipment trade documents, preventing intellectual property theft, renewing contracts
with distributors or spending on marketing costs for each new product.
As our simple model suggested, thresholds determining internationalization mode
choice will be affected by factors related to relative marginal or fixed costs. The theo-
retical model sketched earlier shows that the threshold levels of productivity (and size)
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are determined by the relative cost structure of the three modes of supplying the foreign
market. As we have seen, several theoretical models in the literature provide a number
of predictions on factors which affect this cost structure and, hence, internationaliza-
tion mode choice conditional on productivity. In this section we focus on theoretical
relationships which have empirical counterparts in our firm-level dataset.
Iin the incomplete contract framework of Felbermayr and Jung (2011) as well as
Abel-Koch (2011) hold-up problems may fundamentally affect costs of indirect export-
ing when a considerable amount of knowledge is embedded in the exported product.
As a consequence, firms producing more innovative and R&D-intensive goods are more
likely to choose direct exporting to indirect and FDI to exporting to safeguard their
knowledge. Furthermore, in industries where quality is heterogeneous and hard to ob-
serve, high-quality firms may be more likely to export directly or establish production
facilities for signaling reasons (Abel-Koch (2011)). If innovativeness is positively related
to quality, than this logic provides another mechanism supporting the prediction that
innovativeness is positively related to direct exporting and FDI.
In terms of measurement, we first consider how product specificity may affect
choices. The more specific a product, the greater contracting costs will. We proxy
specificity with knowledge intensity, pricing power and quality assurance. We capture
knowledge intensity by a measure of recent innovation success in firms. The EFIGE
dataset provides a set of variables that describe the result of innovative efforts during
the 2007-09 period rather than just spending on it19. Innovation success is a variable
that collects four dummy variables, hence it ranges between zero and 4. The four
measures of innovation success is:
• applied for a patent
• registered an industrial design
• registered a trade mark
• claimed copyright.
Quality assurance and pricing power are both captured by a dummy variable. The
ISO Quality assurance is a result of investments into safeguarding product (and its
production process) quality management and hence, can be considered as a way to
ensure that features of product specificity will last. In the survey, firms were asked
”Has the firm gone through any form of quality certification (e.g. ISO9000) ?” In our
sample, 60% of firms had quality certification in the past or introduced it recently.
19Other variables tested with no/marginal impact are share of white collar labor forces, or share
of R&D investments within all investments. This suggests that product features that affect matching
and require larger control are best captured by (successful) innovation.
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Pricing power is another evidence of differentiated products20.The survey asks ”How
do you mainly set your prices [in your domestic market]? Firms with some degree of
price setting power could choose ” prices are set as a margin over total costs” or ” prices
are set as a margin over variable costs”, while others opted for ” prices are fixed by the
market” and ” prices are regulated”. In the sample 56% posited to have some pricing
power.
In addition, we will consider a set of important controls both from trade and man-
agement literature. First, being in a multinational group is likely to reduce search
and contracting costs and hence, may be negatively associated both with the fixed and
marginal costs of all international activities, hence one may expect that members of
such international groups are more likely to be engaged in exporting or FDI. There
is no clear prediction, however, on the effect of such international connections on the
relative cost structure of different internationalization modes.
Second, firms which import directly may already have business relationships with
foreign partners and such firms are also more likely to have acquired necessary language
skills and infrastructure. As a result such firms may be able to establish direct export
connections more easily - with a lower fixed cost - than non-importing firms. Hence,
one may expect that directly importing firms are more likely to export directly rather
than indirectly.
Second, we add variables related to the firm’s position in supply and value chains.
We have used three variables to capture the advantage of being in a group. Controlling
is dummy variable for controlling other firms as head of a group or having affiliates.
Controlled by others is dummy variable for controlled by other firms: affiliate or acquired
or is controlled by other firms as part of a group. intra-group clients is dummy variable
for having clients who are part of the same group. In addition, we use the dummy
variable importer for firms who are importer of raw materials and/or intermediate
goods in 2008.
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics.
5.2. Estimation and results
To investigate, we will now consider how different factors may affect costs and hence,
the choice of modes. To do this, we estimate the relationship between international-
ization mode choice and several variables from the EFIGE survey, including benefits of
belonging to groups of firms, savings owing to use of import channels as well as costs
of protecting knowledge or matching.
To do this, we extend the sorting equations and estimate an ordered and a multi-
nomial logit:
Pr(XMijk = Z) = F (α + β
′Gi + γ′Mi + λk + νj + ik) (10)
20For instance in a monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
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Table 8: Distribution of firms by internationalization mode
Trade mode Pricing
power
ISO
assurance
Innovation
success
Controlled Importer
No trade 0.547 0.514 0.175 0.086 0.233
Indirect only 0.546 0.612 0.256 0.114 0.374
Direct export,
no foreign production
0.572 0.635 0.449 0.161 0.506
Foreign production:
contracts
0.551 0.642 0.725 0.263 0.633
FDI 0.523 0.826 1.083 0.252 0.660
Trade mode First
share-
holder
White
collar labor
share
Year of
establishment
Decentralized
decision
Family
owner
No trade 1.035 23.251 1977.197 1.238 0.734
Indirect only 1.052 21.259 1979.708 1.314 0.729
Direct export,
no foreign production
1.110 22.937 1973.580 1.306 0.700
Foreign production:
contracts
1.244 30.109 1971.319 1.360 0.588
FDI 1.271 31.162 1961.440 1.482 0.636
where Gi are the variables of interest - proxies of product specificity, and Mi are
the additional firm features affecting the choice for firm i. Core results are presented
in Table 13, while models including other controls are shown in Table 14.
The ordered logit has the advantage of being efficient but it assumes a common rel-
ative effect across modes. A multinomial logit looses power by estimating four separate
equations, but is able to detect if assumed ordering is indeed valid.
Table 9: Multinomial and ordered logistic regressions
Trade mode 1 2 3 4 5
Pricing power -0.037 0.112*** 0.114 0.129 0.101***
(0.103) (0.04) (0.074) (0.089) (0.033)
ISO assurance 0.309*** 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.758*** 0.259***
(0.111) (0.042) (0.083) (0.117) (0.036)
Innovation success 0.258*** 0.528*** 0.773*** 0.852*** 0.498***
(0.085) (0.033) (0.044) (0.047) (0.022)
Employment (log) 0.085 0.395*** 0.588*** 1.094*** 0.525***
(0.064) (0.024) (0.038) (0.039) (0.018)
cut1 1.936
(0.135)
cut2 2.08
(0.135)
cut3 4.775
(0.141)
cut4 5.82
(0.145)
Based on Table 13 first we can see that the coefficients of TFP and employment
suggest the presence of sorting for direct exporting and FDI as shown by the tests at
the bottom of the table, in line with the previous results. The productivity and size of
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indirect exporters, however, is not significantly different from that of non-exporters.
Innovation success is key in terms of exporting and it also increases the chance of
having a production site abroad. The ordering here is clear and significant. This finding
provides evidence for the hypothesis that firms are less likely to use intermediaries
for the export of more knowledge-intensive or higher quality goods to defend their
knowledge or signal the higher quality of their products. This implies that costs and
risks of contracting for and protecting of innovative products raises marginal costs more
than they affect fixed costs and hences, raise the likelhood of ”upgrading” sales methods.
We have to add, however, that innovation may be a good proxy of some capabilities or
potential of the firm which are not captured fully by productivity.
Regarding the extended estimation, importers are more likely to choose any of the
three internationalization modes, hence importing seems to reduce the cutoff of all three
modes. Interestingly, this is the only variable that sets indirect traders and non-traders
apart. This is related to an interesting pattern - some firms may rely on the foreign
partners to help selling some their products abroad21.
Controlling other firms allows foreign production without new investments, no won-
der it induces the likelihood of sales from those sites outside the host country. At the
same time, it does not affect the likelihood of direct sales. Being controlled by other
firms increases the likelihood of direct sales (to the parent company or partners of the
parent company), and production abroad. These findings suggest that owning other
firms naturally reduces the fixed cost of foreign production, while the main benefit
of having a foreign owner may be a smaller fixed cost of exporting directly. Our re-
sults, emphasizing the importance of sales from foreign production as well as within
group sales are in line with a recent strand of literature discussing intra-company sales
(Defever and Toubal (2009); Corcos et al. (2012)).
Overall, these results support the view that costs are affected by contractual re-
lationships and proximity as well as ownership can reduce relative fixed costs while
innovation may increase marginal costs - with both resulting in greater control over
sales.
6. Extension to markets
So far, for each firm, we considered just one bundle of destinations markets, results
were presented at the firm level. For direct exports, contracted manufacturing and
direct investment, our data allows us distinguishing a firm’s activity by destinations
regions. Countries are lumped into eight regions: (1) EU-West, (2) EU-CEE (3) Other
European countries, (4) USA and Canada, (5) South America, (6) China and India, (7)
21We looked at several websites of firms, those who indicated direct trade were more likely to have
a foreign language site than those who indicated indirect trade only.
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Table 10: Multinomial and ordered logistic regressions 2
Trade mode 1 2 3 4 5
Pricing power -0.145 0.081* 0.115 0.09 0.078**
(0.113) (0.044) (0.081) (0.096) (0.036)
ISO assurance 0.283** 0.188*** 0.112 0.647*** 0.176***
(0.123) (0.047) (0.091) (0.125) (0.04)
Innovation success 0.227** 0.473*** 0.699*** 0.777*** 0.446***
(0.092) (0.036) (0.048) (0.051) (0.024)
Controlled 0.132 0.242*** 0.386*** 0.043 0.108*
(0.189) (0.074) (0.113) (0.132) (0.056)
Importer 0.672*** 1.019*** 1.292*** 1.217*** 0.845***
(0.121) (0.048) (0.087) (0.104) (0.039)
First shareholder 0.078 0.712*** 1.366*** 1.329*** 0.766***
(0.271) (0.1) (0.131) (0.146) (0.068)
White collar labor share -0.003 0.001 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Year of establishment 0.002 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Centralized decisions 0.295** 0.188*** 0.331*** 0.507*** 0.237***
(0.127) (0.051) (0.088) (0.101) (0.041)
Family owner 0.078 -0.014 -0.132 0.158 0.019
(0.134) (0.052) (0.09) (0.11) (0.042)
Employment (log) 0.056 0.237*** 0.368*** 0.875*** 0.371***
(0.073) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045) (0.021)
cut1 -5.925
(1.243)
cut2 -5.778
(1.243)
cut3 -2.907
(1.242)
cut4 -1.85
(1.242)
Asia-ex CI, (8) Africa and other22.
Looking at the level of firm-region gives way to avoid the potential pitfalls of aggre-
gation: selection to different countries. Transport costs, market size, sophistication of
destinations as well as uncertainty may determine the choice amomg modes of servic-
ing markets. There may be several reasons for country-specifc factors to affect choices.
Firms serving closer markets may know them better, face lower supervision costs and
hence, incline to invest directly. Heavier products may be expensive to ship and are
hence more likely to produced at farway countries. Uncertainty at markets (Conconi
et al., 2013) may lead to firms exporting or looking for contract manufacturing rather
than making direct investments.
Furthermore, cheap labor may prompt great deal of vertical integration and ou
22Note that EU-West is 15 Western European EU members, EU-CEE is 10 EU member Central and
Eastern Europen, Asia ex-CI - Asian countries ex China and India, South America includes Central-
America and Mexico, non-EU Europe includes Serbia, Russia, Ukraine as well as Norway, Switzerland,
Africa and other include Oceania.
22
tsourced production. Indeed, for European firms, China is place for a great deal of
vertical production - possibly along with other countries of Asia, and this may distort
our results. By looking at individual regions, such as North America, or EU15, this
issue of possibly mixing vertical and horizontal investment is less threatening.
In this subsection, we first present descriptive statistics on firm-region level data
and repeat our core exercise region by region.
To investigate this potential selection issue, we created a new firm-region database,
where each cells describe if a firm sells to region in a give mode. This information is
unavailable for indirect exports, so we have four modes: non-trader, direct exporter,
contrac manufacturer and direct investor. Once again these modes are ordered, and
hence a higher mode may or may not have used other modes. For instance a con-
tract manufacturer will include firms who also export, but not those who did direct
investment.
Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the frequency of firms
serving individual regions, while Panel B depicts average firm size - number of employees
- by region and type of modes.
Table 11: Description of activities by regions
Panel A: Number of firms
Exporter Contract Manuf. Direct Inv. Total
China, India 1660 240 234 1958
South America 1564 32 81 1611
EU-West 7240 342 396 7446
Non-EU Europe 3363 104 134 3472
Africa and others 2021 104 127 2157
Asia ex-CI 1931 101 90 2027
EU-CEE 3198 185 227 3387
USA, Canada 2499 71 155 2581
Panel B: Average employment
Exporter Contract Manuf. Direct Inv. Total
China, India 180 275 729 202
South America 176 1200 959 189
EU-West 123 278 618 130
Non-EU Europe 147 345 628 156
Africa and others 136 239 586 156
Asia ex-CI 160 270 836 174
EU-CEE 166 275 652 178
USA, Canada 173 754 879 186
EU-West is 15 Western European EU members, EU-East is 10 CEE country
Asia ex CI - excluding China and India, South America includes Central-America and Mexico
Non-EU Europe includes Serbia, Russia as well as Norway, Africa and others include Oceania
From Panel A, it is clear, that Western Europe is by far the most popular destination
of any activity. For exports, this is follwed by Central and Eastern Europe, and other
European (non-EU member) countries such as Switzerland or Russia. For contract
investment and FDI, the most likely non Western EU destination is China-India as
well as EU member countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Regarding sunk costs
of activities, the average firm exporting to Western Europe is the smallerst (with 123
23
employees) with others typically ranging at 150-180. Importantly, we can capture the
ranking by size across modes at all regions and at similar magnitudes.
To investigate selection, we repeated the ordered logit model of Table 12, column 5,
individually for all regions.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed what affects the choice for a firm when selecting a mode
of internationalization. Firms can sell their product abroad by relying on a local inter-
mediary (e.g. a trade facilitator or a wholesaler), exporting directly to foreign parties
or setting up a production facility to serve the local market. Using survey data on
three European countries, France, Italy and Spain, we found that there is no evidence
on sorting to indirect trade from home sales only, however strong evidence is found for
sorting into direct exporting and FDI. We calibrated a simple model to show that the
frequency of various modes in our data suggest large trade costs for direct exporting and
FDI, while indirect exporting has either a high fixed or marginal cost making it seldom
selected. The small number of indirect exporters and their similarity to non-exporters
suggests that sorting models are less able to describe this choice well then the decision
to invest into direct exporting or FDI. This may be explained by the relatively low
fixed cost of indirect trade or the presence of other dimensions of heterogeneity besides
productivity, such as firm-level differences in sunk costs. Eventually data imperfection
may also reduce the prevalence of non-direct exporters.
Furthermore, we found that features of firms and products such as innovative content
at the firm or the industry level will affect the trade mode choice - in line with theories
emphasizing contractual problems. Belonging to groups or directly importing seems to
be associated with small fixed costs of direct exporting and foreign production.
In terms policy implications, our results suggest that fixed costs of upgrading to
more costly internationalization modes are high and hence, small policy interventions
are unlikely to succeed. Nevertheless, indirect export does not seem very costly hence
fostering contacts between producers and intermediaries may be a relatively cheap so-
lution to help foreign sales.
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Appendix 1: Further tables
Table 13: Predictions, panel A–C
Panel A. Probability: no export
Product differentiation
No market power Market power
iso: no iso: yes iso: no iso: yes
Innovation success
0 0.585 0.506 0.560 0.480
1 0.444 0.364 0.418 0.340
2 0.308 0.239 0.285 0.219
3 0.195 0.143 0.178 0.130
4 0.114 0.080 0.103 0.072
Panel B. Probability: indirect export
Product differentiation
No market power Market power
iso: no iso: yes iso: no iso: yes
Innovation success
0 0.030 0.035 0.028 0.032
1 0.029 0.033 0.027 0.030
2 0.026 0.028 0.024 0.025
3 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.019
4 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.014
Panel C. Probability: direct export
Product differentiation
No market power Market power
iso: no iso: yes iso: no iso: yes
Innovation success
0 0.311 0.352 0.333 0.374
1 0.400 0.430 0.421 0.448
2 0.470 0.477 0.487 0.490
3 0.505 0.486 0.515 0.492
4 0.501 0.460 0.507 0.462
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Table 14: Predictions, Panel D–F
Panel D. Probability: contracts
Product differentiation
No market power Market power
iso: no iso: yes iso: no iso: yes
Innovation success
0 0.043 0.048 0.046 0.052
1 0.070 0.076 0.074 0.079
2 0.106 0.107 0.110 0.110
3 0.145 0.139 0.148 0.142
4 0.184 0.169 0.186 0.170
Panel E. Probability: direct investment
Product differentiation
No market power Market power
iso: no iso: yes iso: no iso: yes
Innovation success
0 0.031 0.058 0.034 0.062
1 0.056 0.097 0.060 0.103
2 0.090 0.149 0.095 0.156
3 0.134 0.210 0.139 0.217
4 0.184 0.276 0.189 0.282
Panel F. Innovation and internationalization choice
Firm with ISO and market power
no export indirect direct contract FDI
Innovation success
0 0.480 0.032 0.374 0.052 0.062
1 0.340 0.030 0.448 0.079 0.103
2 0.219 0.025 0.490 0.110 0.156
3 0.130 0.019 0.492 0.142 0.217
4 0.072 0.014 0.462 0.170 0.282
Appendix 2: TFP estimation
The starting point for our TFP estimation is a production function in log-linearized
form:
lnV Ait = α + βK lnCapitalit + +βL lnLaborit + ηi + it (11)
Here V A is value added, ηi is the time invariant firm specific fixed effects and it
is firm-specific productivity shocks. These productivity shocks represents the main
problem in the estimation since they are not observable for the econometrician but
firms decide on their choice of input based on their realized productivity. In addition
the correlation problem between labor and the shocks can be more severe because labor
assumed to adjust more rapidly than capital.
To solve this endogeneity problem Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) offered a method
where unobservable productivity shocks can be proxied by intermediate inputs (such
as materials and electricity) and capital. They propose a two-step estimation method
where the standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping methods. One of the main
problems with this two-step approach is that if firms choose labor input optimally in
the first stage equation then labor is also a function of unobserved productivity and its
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Table 15: Exporters by country
Full Sample No trade Indirect
only
Direct, no
foreign prod.
Foreign
production
Austria 444 35.4% 1.8% 47.3% 15.5%
France 2973 44.5% 3.3% 41.1% 11.1%
Germany 2935 47.8% 2.7% 37.8% 11.7%
Hungary 488 37.9% 6.4% 50.4% 5.3%
Italy 3021 30.5% 2.4% 59.3% 7.7%
Spain 2832 43.9% 4.4% 46.6% 5.1%
United Kingdom 2067 37.0% 1.3% 49.2% 12.6%
Table 16: by internationalisation mode (2nd version)
Full sample Percent Restricted
sample
Percent
No trade 6099 41.3% 3540 40.1%
Indirect only 458 3.1% 309 3.5%
Direct, no foreign prod. 7277 49.3% 4558 51.6%
Foreign production 926 6.3% 419 4.7%
Total 14760 100.0% 8826 100.0%
Note: Foreign production is only based on the FDI dummy.
coefficient is nonparametrically unidentified Ackerberg et al. (2006).
Wooldridge (2009) proposed a joint GMM estimation method for the two equation
which has the advantage that the labor input can be identified properly. Further advan-
tages of this estimation are that we can easily obtain the robust standard errors and the
GMM’s weighting matrix account for possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
problems. We use this method to obtain TFP with materials as intermediate inputs.
Since the shape of the production function can differ across countries and industries we
estimate the equations separately for all country-industry pairs.
Furthermore we are dealing with firms that may be active at international markets
so given trade status (importer, various export modes) might affect the firm’s input
choices and prices it faces, and thus drive part of the simultaneity bias in productivity
estimation. In the spirit of suggestion made by Amiti and Konings (2007), we made a
small change in the original GMM methodology proposed by Wooldridge (2009), adding
a trade status dummy as control variable into the production function. Our modified
TFP is based on this estimation. The trade status dummy is one if the firm is active as
importer and/or exporter of any sorts and zero otherwise. Note that this modification
makes little quantitative effect and no qualitative impact on our results.
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Table 17: Characteristics by internationalisation mode
turnover
(m euro)
no. Em-
ployees
year of
estab.
TFP
(modified)
TFP
(original)
Labor
prod.
No trade 5854.1 43.35 1981.4 4.02 4.02 4.78
Indirect only 6442.7 45.53 1980.8 4.00 4.00 4.78
Direct, no foreign prod. 20347.6 73.86 1975.4 4.07 4.06 5.12
Foreign production 108317.7 192.86 1968.1 4.50 4.49 5.33
Table 18: Internationalisation mode choice: sorting
Dep var: international-
ization mode
(1) (2) (3)
Base: No trade Indirect Direct Foreign
prod.
Indirect Direct Foreign
prod.
Indirect Direct Foreign
prod.
Log(employ.) 0.147 0.590*** 1.313*** 0.053 0.587*** 1.315***
(0.097) (0.037) (0.058) (0.115) (0.041) (0.064)
TFP -0.011 0.289*** 0.762*** -0.024 0.138*** 0.285***
(0.120) (0.043) (0.082) (0.126) (0.045) (0.088)
Country, industry (d) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -2.855*** -2.072*** -7.993*** -2.532*** -1.196*** -6.059*** -2.656*** -2.564*** -9.251***
(0.374) (0.148) (0.361) (0.517) (0.187) (0.425) (0.594) (0.217) (0.494)
Observations 6,189 6,189 6,189 5,562 5,562 5,562 5,562 5,562 5,562
Log Likelihood -5399 -5399 -5399 -5039 -5039 -5039 -4778 -4778 -4778
Pseudo R-squared 0.0911 0.0911 0.0911 0.0488 0.0488 0.0488 0.0981 0.0981 0.0981
Employment test 21.64*** 221.9*** 22.18*** 185.7***
TFP test 6.386** 38.19*** 1.694 3.312*
Notes: Multinomial logit. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 19: Internationalisation mode choice: sorting with other variables
Dep var: international-
ization mode
(1) (2)
Base: No trade Indirect Direct Foreign
prod.
Indirect Direct Foreign
prod.
TFP (original) -0.113 0.102** 0.238***
(0.129) (0.046) (0.074)
Labour prod. -0.018 0.542*** 0.785***
(0.115) (0.044) (0.082)
Log (employment) 0.046 0.579*** 1.146*** 0.144 0.545*** 1.086***
(0.119) (0.041) (0.056) (0.102) (0.038) (0.052)
Country, industry (d) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -2.302*** -2.389*** -8.242*** -2.762*** -4.642*** -10.999***
(0.610) (0.219) (0.422) (0.660) (0.266) (0.528)
Observations 5,570 5,570 5,570 6,184 6,184 6,184
Log Likelihood -5117 -5117 -5117 -5650 -5650 -5650
Pseudo R-squared 0.0918 0.0918 0.0918 0.101 0.101 0.101
TFP test 23.97*** 10.10***
Lab prod test 2.807* 4.191**
Emp test 20.56*** 161.4*** 16.17*** 170.0***
Notes: Multinomial logit. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 20: Multinomial and ordered logistic regressions
Trade mode 1 2 3 4 Ord.Log
Privcing power 0.195 0.161** 0 0.065 0.113**
(0.172) (0.065) (0.127) (0.158) (0.055)
ISO assurance 0.493*** 0.489*** 0.787*** 1.82*** 0.554***
(0.176) (0.066) (0.139) (0.218) (0.057)
Innovation success 0.046 0.656*** 0.999*** 1.17*** 0.634***
(0.176) (0.06) (0.081) (0.088) (0.039)
TFP -0.064 0.311*** 0.533*** 0.746*** 0.394***
(0.133) (0.049) (0.089) (0.1) (0.04)
cut1 1.8
(0.183)
cut2 1.944
(0.183)
cut3 4.949
(0.196)
cut4 6.056
(0.206)
Table 21: Multinomial and ordered logistic regressions D
Trade mode 1 2 3 4 5
Pricing power 0,2 0,154** 0,194 0,06 0,096
(0,192) (0,073) (0,141) (0,174) (0,061)
ISO assurance 0,552*** 0,326*** 0,538*** 1,505*** 0,385***
(0,2) (0,076) (0,155) (0,236) (0,064)
Innovation success 0,094 0,587*** 0,921*** 1,024*** 0,544***
(0,183) (0,067) (0,091) (0,099) (0,043)
Controlled 0,255 0,292** 0,328* 0,026 0,139
(0,295) (0,116) (0,188) (0,239) (0,09)
Importer 0,737*** 1,121*** 1,463*** 2,047*** 1,035***
(0,198) (0,079) (0,15) (0,204) (0,065)
First shareholder -1 585 0,872*** 1,521*** 1,382*** 0,83***
(1,028) (0,188) (0,239) (0,277) (0,121)
White collar labor share -0,003 0,003 0,01*** 0,008* 0,004**
(0,006) (0,002) (0,003) (0,005) (0,002)
Year of establishment -0,005 -0,013*** -0,011*** -0,022*** -0,01***
(0,004) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,001)
Centralized decisions 0,067 0,25*** 0,366** 0,538*** 0,233***
(0,225) (0,089) (0,16) (0,189) (0,072)
Family owner -0,176 0,044 -0,064 0,007 0,015
(0,213) (0,085) (0,153) (0,193) (0,069)
TFP -0,103 0,191*** 0,323*** 0,459*** 0,245***
(0,151) (0,056) (0,096) (0,108) (0,045)
cut1 -17.242
(2,503)
cut2 -17.091
(2,503)
cut3 -13.785
(2,498)
cut4 -12.65
(2,498)
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